Intentional Torts: Intent, Battery, and Transferred Intent (1L Guide)

Intent in tort law does not mean intent to harm. It means the defendant acted either with the purpose of causing a particular result, or with knowledge that the result was substantially certain to occur. Either prong satisfies intent.

The leading case is Garratt v. Dailey, where a young boy pulled a chair out from under a woman as she sat down. Even without a desire to hurt her, he could be liable if he knew with substantial certainty that she would hit the ground. That "substantial certainty" prong is what makes intent broader than everyday usage.

So when you analyze an intentional tort, you're not asking whether the defendant wanted to injure anyone. You're asking whether they intended the contact or apprehension itself — by purpose or by substantial certainty.

Battery is an intentional act that causes a harmful or offensive contact with another person. The contact need not be harmful — an offensive contact (judged by what would offend a reasonable sense of personal dignity) is enough, and contact with something closely connected to the person (like a plate they're holding) can count.

Assault is an intentional act that causes a reasonable apprehension of an imminent harmful or offensive contact. Note "apprehension," not fear, and "imminent" — words alone usually aren't enough, and a threat of future harm doesn't qualify. Assault protects your peace of mind; battery protects your physical person.

Transferred intent lets a defendant's intent "transfer" in two ways. First, across victims: if you intend to hit A but hit B, your intent transfers to B. Second, across torts: if you intend one tort (say, to frighten someone — assault) but accomplish another (you actually hit them — battery), the intent transfers between them.

The doctrine classically applies among five torts: battery, assault, false imprisonment, trespass to land, and trespass to chattels. If the defendant intended any one of these and ends up committing any of the others (or harms a different victim), intent is satisfied.

This is why a defendant can't escape liability by saying "I was aiming at someone else" or "I only meant to scare him." The intentional-tort framework cares that the defendant intended a tortious act of this family — not that everything went exactly as planned.

Once liability is established, the eggshell-skull (or "thin-skull") rule says the defendant takes the victim as they find them. If the plaintiff suffers far worse harm than a typical person would because of a pre-existing vulnerability, the defendant is still liable for the full extent of the harm.

It's important to place this correctly: the eggshell-skull rule is about the scope of damages, not about whether intent or the elements are met. It expands recovery after a tort is proven; it doesn't create the tort.

On exams, reach for it only after you've established the underlying tort. Then use it to reject the defense argument that the plaintiff was "unusually fragile," which is not a defense to the amount of harm caused.

The number-one error in intentional torts is requiring that the defendant wanted to injure the plaintiff. They don't. Intent is satisfied by purpose to cause the contact (or apprehension) or knowledge that it's substantially certain to result — not by any desire to cause damage.

A second mistake is overlooking transferred intent and concluding there's no liability because the defendant "meant" to do something to someone else, or meant a different tort. Within the five-tort family, that intent still transfers.

Finally, students sometimes try to use the eggshell-skull rule to establish liability. It doesn't do that. First prove the tort and its elements; the thin-skull rule only governs how far the resulting damages extend.